This essay concerns the problems surrounding the use of the term "concept" in current ontology and terminology research. It is based on the constructive dialogue between realist ontology on the one hand and the world of formal standardization of health informatics on the other, but its conclusions are not restricted to the domain of medicine. The term "concept" is one of the most misused even in literature and technical standards which attempt to bring clarity. In this paper we propose to use the term "concept" in the context of producing defined professional terminologies with one specific and consistent meaning which we propose for adoption as the agreed meaning of the term in future terminological research, and specifically in the development of formal terminologies to be used in computer systems. We also discuss and propose new definitions of a set of cognate terms. We describe the relations governing the realm of concepts, and compare these to the richer and more complex set of relations obtaining between entities in the real world. On this basis we also summarize an associated terminology for ontologies as representations of the real world and a partial mapping between the world of concepts and the world of reality.
Introduction
In recent years Smith and other realist philosophers such as Ingvar Johansson have been challenging established standardization endeavours in Health Informatics dealing with what are called "concepts". Bodenreider et al., Schulz and Jansen, Spackman and Reynoso, Ceusters et al. and others have also contributed to these discussions [Bodenreider 04, Schulz 06, Spackman 04, Ceusters 06] , the results of which are summarized in a series of papers by Smith and his co-workers, in which it is argued that the concept of "concept" is used in much of the work on biomedical terminologies, ontologies and controlled vocabularies in ways that are seriously flawed. 1 The main critique has been that the 1 For those involved in terminology standardization as it applies to ISO's Technical Committee 37 founded by the Austrian terminologist Eugen Wüster and to its successor institutions, an item of specific interest is the paper by Smith, Ceusters and Temmerman entitled "Wüsteria" [Smith 05c ]. In this paper it is argued that Wüster's influence led to a pervasive confusion between concepts and entities in reality. One reason to bring this up here is the recent discussion of the draft EN 15822 Health informatics -Categorial Structure for Anatomy in health informatics circles. Another is the growth in significance of the HL7 Reference Information Model, which Smith and Ceusters see as a particularly egregious embodiment of the Wüsterian confusion, with serious consequences in the form of failed health informatics projects involving major investments by national term "concept" in these standards is used in multiple ways. It is often unclearly defined (or not defined at all). Where it is defined it is often viewed as signifying the result of some cognitive process, for example in the form of knowledge in the mind of an expert or an entry in a terminological system.
Problems then arise, because attempts are simultaneously made to use the same term for purposes of reasoning among relationships between entities in the real world.
Most recently, prominent former advocates of the concept-based approach have recognized some of the merits of this critique, as for example Cimino, who argues that both concepts and universals 'be embraced and can co-exist peacefully in controlled terminologies' [Cimino 06] , and Solbrig and Chute, who argue that 'the use of the term "concept" as the name of a class in a model can introduce serious confusion' [Solbrig 09 ].
In what follows we describe an irenic proposal to overcome these confusions. The authors of this communication agree that the term "concept" has been misused in, many influential writings, but we accept that this term can still serve an important role in modern health informatics if only it is governments [Smith 06c ]. For an overview see: http://hl7-watch.blogspot.com/.
properly used. We agree also that there is a need to have a serious and constructive discussion on how to resolve the problems which have arisen through its misuse. We propose a set of terms and definitions that we believe should replace the single term "concept" in those specialist contexts where information structures and semantic interoperability is the concern. We have of course no ambition to change the very frequent and varying uses of the term "concept" in natural language discourse.
While one of us, Klein, is an M.D. and has his main function in Health Informatics -hence the use of many examples from the health area -there is nothing specific to the healthcare domain about the problems and solutions discussed.
Concept -A strange animal with many heads

The history of the use of the term "concept"
The term "concept" has a long history, going back at least as far as Plato. For present purposes it is important to refer to the great medieval dispute between realists, conceptualists and nominalists over the so-called "problem of universals" [Klima 03 ].
Realists hold that there are universals -invariant patterns (also called characters or essences, corresponding to common nouns such as 'electron' or 'molecule' used in the expression of scientific laws) -existing on the side of entities in reality, and that it is in virtue of such universals that particulars -for example these two particular triangular shapes in Figure 1 
Towards disambiguation
Traces of all three of these positions are present in contemporary uses of the term "concept" in ontology and terminology circles. Thus in some contexts the term "concept" refers to what would more properly be called a "universal" in the sense of the realist doctrine; in some contexts it refers to general ideas in people's minds; and in yet other contexts it refers merely to general terms in some controlled language.
Contradictions then arise because such distinct readings are not clearly distinguished in the relevant literature [Smith 04 ].
To make matters worse, psychological, linguistic and computational uses of the term "concept" have in more recent years also been added to this mix, so that there are today a number of different viewpoints developed for different, yet often related, purposes where the term "concept" has been applied, often unconsciously, with very different meanings.
Further confusions arise because the term is sometimes used with a meaning that is left unspecified or with different and The heart of our proposal, simply put, is that "concept"
should be used exclusively to refer (1) to the meaning of a corresponding general term, this meaning being (2) When dealing with human constructions such as mandates, agreements, contracts and the like, there is an obvious distinction between the entity referred to on the one hand (i.e.
the mandate in question), and the meaning of the term ("mandate") which is used to refer to this entity. Only the latter, then, would be a candidate for being identified as a concept, in the sense of our proposal.
On psychological uses of the term "concept"
In natural language, and in some of the work of Eugen
Wüster and other influential terminologists, the term This need is all the more urgent given the influence of Wüster's ideas on the literature of terminology standardization.
Recommendations regarding the use of "concept" and related terms
We recommend that the listed terms be used in terminological contexts exclusively in the following ways:
Term: Concept concept in a terminological system (synonym 1) agreed meaning of a term (synonym 2)
Definition: meaning of a term as agreed upon by a group of responsible persons Note 1: The assumption here is that this meaning (for example of a term such as "nephron" or "influenza") will be agreed upon in virtue of the fact that it is accepted and understood by the members of the relevant community, e.g. a unit of knowledge created by a unique combination of characteristics. We prefer "meaning" to "unit of knowledge", for a number of reasons. First, there can be agreed meanings for terms like "unicorn" which do not correspond to any unit of knowledge, since there are no corresponding entities in reality about which knowledge could be gained. We also prefer "meaning" to "unit of thought", in order to avoid the psychological connotations of the latter. Our investigations suggest that the term "characteristic" is subject to the same sorts of problems as have affected the term "concept". This generic relation between concepts can be called a semantic relation, in order to stress the fact that it is a relation which has agreed meanings as its relata. In what follows we shall refer to it by means of the compound phrase "is_a (is narrower in meaning than)".
Recommendations regarding treatment of relations between concepts
What ISO1087-1 calls "partitive" and "associative relations" (such as part_of or causes) are not appropriate for concept systems -since they are not relations which hold between meanings. Such relations should be used, rather, in ontologies (see below), in which real world entities and there interrelations are taken into account.
Terminology for ontologies
Entities
If concept systems are systems of meanings, then we need a supplementary terminology for those representation systems which relate to real world entities, both those investigated by the natural sciences (for example cells or electrons) and those existing in administrative domains (such as mandates or documents recording lab results). Unfortunately this terminology -the terminology of ontology -is not yet established in a consistent way in informatics and terminology circles.
What we propose here reflects an emerging consensus in ontological research; but we also provide alternative synonyms (in parentheses) to serve as guidance for the wider community. Our remarks supplement the proposals advanced in [Smith 06b ], which are in turn being adopted by the ontologies developed by the OBO Foundry (http://obofoundry.org), a consortium of influential ontology groups in the bio-sciences.
Instances and types
The entities in reality are of two kinds: "instances" and "types", for short: see Figure 3 . Alternative terms for what we here call "type" are "universal", which is used frequently in realist philosophy and modern ontology, and also: "class", "kind", "category", "genus", "species", "taxon".
What we here propose to call "instance" has in the ontology literature also been called "individual" or "particular". These terms can be regarded as synonyms in this context, but we prefer the term "instance" since it draws attention to the fact that the entities in question are instances of corresponding types. Thus the particular cell in this Petri-dish is an instance of the type cell, as also of the type B-lymphocyte, and so on.
Continuants and occurrents
Entities (instances and types) can be further classified according to the following scheme focusing on their persistence, dividing them into two main kinds occurrents and continuants, Figure 4 .
Relations between real-world entities
Individual instances can have various relations to other instances. For example Mary's heart is part of Mary; Mary's run is part of Mary's morning work-out, and so on. In some cases all instances of a given type stand in such relations to correlated instances of some other type. Thus all instances of the type influenza are also instances of the type infectious disease. All instances of the type adult are identical to some instance of the type child existing at some earlier time. All We propose that the term "class" be used to refer to collections of instances which are maximal in the sense that they comprehend all and only the entities to which a given general term applies. Where the general term in question refers to a type, then the corresponding maximal collection is the extension of this type. This class contains all and only those instances which as a matter of fact instantiate the corresponding type at the given time.
Clearly, now, the totality of classes is wider than the totality of extensions of types, since it includes also more or less ad hoc or defined classes designated by terms like "employee of Swedish bank", "daughter of Finnish popstar" and so on.
Recommendations concerning terminology for ontologies
We can now define the term "ontology" in a way which is, we believe, in close conformity with a common consensus use In spite of this parallelism, however, the term "concept"
should still never be used in place of "type" ("universal") as thus defined, because the parallelism is only partial. First, there are concepts (understood in the sense of our proposal), for example those associated with terms like:
• case of pneumonia in Russian fiction
• fractured lip
• surgical procedure not performed because of patient request • absent scrotum which correspond to no real-world entities on the instance level. Second, there are concepts such as:
• non-rainy day
• non-mammal
• relative of possible smoker
• other metalworker in New Zealand
• person admitted before 9a.m.
• mixture of water and alcohol containing zero amount of alcohol • leukemia without mention of remission 5 which refer to no real-world entities on the level of types.
Rather, at best, they refer to ad hoc or defined classes of one or other sort.
Thus only some subset of the nodes in a given biomedical concept system will be mappable in a 1-1 way to corresponding nodes in a type system or realism-based ontology.
Types, concepts and relations
Types and concepts should be kept clearly separate also because of the different ways in which they are connected by relations.
Certainly some of the nodes in concept systems stand in is_a (is narrower in meaning than) relations in ways which are isomorphic to the is_a (is subtype of) relations which hold between the nodes in a corresponding ontology. But there are many more is_a relations of the former type than of the latter.
There are also many non-is_a (is subtype of) relations connecting types in ontologies that have no application to concept systems, including all the familiar relations part_of, transformation_of, located_in, derives_from, adjacent_to, participates_in, and so on.
Concept systems are thus simple hierarchies, whose nodes are joined together exclusively by is_a (is narrower in meaning than) relations. Ontologies typically manifest much more complex graph-theoretic structures, in which many further relational edges are included. On the other hand concept systems may be much richer, since they may include many nodes which correspond to no types on the side of reality.
Conclusion
There is room, as we hope is now clear, for both concept systems and ontologies, and we anticipate that, because they address different sorts of purpose, both sorts of information artifact will be needed in the future. We hope, however, that the current confusions which pervade the field of information standards will, in light of our remarks in the above, finally be addressed, so that these different purposes can be addressed more successfully in the future.
5 Odd terms such as "Leukemia without mention of remission" appear in coding systems in order to ensure non-redundancy of coding. Without such terms, patients coded with "leukemia" and patients coded with "leukemia with remission" would be counted twice. The problem is that the terms in question do not correspond to the way clinicians and biologists think about the corresponding phenomena on the side of the patient. Moreover, they introduce an inherent element of fragility in the coding, since what is and is not mentioned in a given record will of course change with time.
